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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 08-3660
                              
JAMAL BARR,
Appellant
v.
JULIE KNAUER; DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; 
DR. FELIPE ARIAS; SHARON BURKE; FRANK MASINO; 
GIA FREEMAN; MR. SGT. CURRANT
                              
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-02888)
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin
                              
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 5, 2009
Before:  BARRY, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 10, 2009)
                              
OPINION
                              
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Jamal Barr, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s
2dismissal of his complaint.  For substantially the same reasons provided by the District
Court, we will summarily affirm.
On August 23, 2007, Barr, a prisoner at State Correctional Institution – Graterford,
filed a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical
condition.  Barr’s complaint stems from the confiscation of his electric razor on
November 28, 2006 by defendant Sgt. Currant.  Barr informed Sgt. Currant that he was
medically approved at other correctional institutions to have the electric razor because he
has a condition which he referred to as “Facial Derm.”  Barr requested “sick call” and
was seen by two of the prison’s physician assistants, who explained to Barr that he would
need approval by Dr. Arias to use an electric razor.  Dr. Arias refused, and Barr filed a
grievance with defendant Knauer, who noted that Barr had no medical documentation
regarding his need for an electric razor in his file.  Barr pursued his grievance through the
proper channels, but his request was denied by defendants DiGuglielmo and Burk
pursuant to a correctional policy eliminating previous authorization of electric razors. 
Barr alleges that defendants acted with deliberate indifference because when he informed
them of his medical condition, they refused to permit him use of his electric razor.  He
claimed that his Fourth,  Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated and
requested declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as appointment of counsel.  
Defendants Arias, Masino, and Freeman moved to dismiss Barr’s claims under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The District Court granted defendants’ motion, concluding that
3Barr failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to the merits of
his constitutional claims.  The court found that the remaining defendants did not receive
proper service of Barr’s complaint and separately dismissed Barr’s claims against these
defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii).  Barr appeals.
We have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We
conduct de novo review of the District Court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(b)(6). 
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).  We must accept as
true all of the allegations contained in the complaint and draw all inferences from the
facts alleged in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff.  Id. at 229; See also Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89; 129 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam).  Barr’s complaint must
“possess enough heft to show that [he] is entitled to relief.”  Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).  Otherwise, because Barr is proceeding in forma pauperis in
this appeal, we must dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) if it is legally
frivolous.
We agree with the District Court that Barr’s has not sufficiently alleged an Eighth
Amendment violation.  The Eighth Amendment proscribes deliberate indifference
towards the serious medical needs of prisoners as it constitutes the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.”  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).  In order to state a
cognizable claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to their medical needs and (2) that those needs were serious.”  Rouse v.
4Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).
Here, Barr alleged that he was denied approval for treating his skin condition,
“Facial Derm,” but did not allege any facts regarding the nature or seriousness of his
ailment.  He complains that he is entitled to an electric razor without stating why one is
medically necessary or why, without one, he faces substantial injury.  In short, he has
failed to adequately allege that his “Facial Derm” constitutes a “serious medical need.” 
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-106.  
Nor has he adequately alleged “deliberate indifference.”  Barr relies exclusively on
the fact that the prison doctor refused to approve an electric razor, despite previous
approval, and suggests no basis for inferring that this refusal indicated that defendants
had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835
(1994).  Deliberate indifference requires that prison officials know of an excessive risk to
an inmate’s health or safety and disregard that risk.  Id. at 837-838.  Barr has not pled that
defendants were aware that any substantial risk of harm would occur by depriving Barr
access to an electric razor.  There are no facts from which the Court may conclude that
defendants knew that deprivation of an electric razor would expose Barr to  “undue
suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Id.; Monmouth County Corr. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (citing Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th
Cir. 1976).)  Without alleging more, Barr’s Eighth Amendment claim cannot succeed.  
With respect to his remaining constitutional claims, prisoners do not have a right to
5privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches during incarceration.  Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001).  Thus,
seizure of Barr’s electric razor cannot constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.  Nor
does it constitute a due process violation if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the
loss is available.  Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.  We have previously held that the prison’s
grievance program and internal review provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy to
satisfy due process.  Tillman v. Lebanon County Correctional, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir.
2000).  Barr has provided no basis for concluding otherwise in his case.
As Barr’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.   See
3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
